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Abstract 
Federal contractors must deal with an exceptional amount of paperwork and 
bureaucracy relative to firms that deal only with the private sector.  I investigate 
whether federal contractor’s costs have different responses to revenue increases 
and decreases. I start by generating a set of federal focus firms that have a business 
unit name that incorporates the words federal, military, and defense.  These firms 
have built their organizational structure around  federal contracting.  Because extra 
paperwork costs are likely to be part of the Selling, General, and Administrative 
(SGA) costs, I estimate a model of SGA sticky costs.  I find that when revenues 
increase, federal focus firms have greater increases in SGA costs compared to 
controls.  This increase is consistent with higher fulfillment costs for federal 
contracts. When revenues decrease, federal focus firms have a much lower 
decrease in SGA costs compared to controls.  Federal focus firms have extremely 
sticky SGA costs.  This stickiness is consistent with federal focus firms having higher 
fixed costs in their procurement systems.  
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Introduction 
The Department of Defense (DOD) is currently implementing the Better 
Buying Power initiative (DOD, n.d.), which focuses on “the implementation of best 
practices to strengthen the Defense Department’s buying power, improve industry 
productivity, and provide an affordable, value-added military capability to the 
Warfighter.”  An important plank of this approach is “Eliminate Unproductive 
Processes and Bureaucracy” (DOD, n.d.).   
Government contractors have the normal concerns about costs of 
production/profit margin. However, they also must deal with an exceptional amount 
of paperwork relative to non-governmental contracts, and usually must hire 
specialized staff to generate and maintain the required information (Kovacic, 1992).  
The additional paperwork and extra staff clearly qualify as potentially unproductive 
processes and as bureaucracy. 
My research examines whether these additional costs are sufficiently large to 
affect the firm’s financial statements.  If these government-specific costs are real and 
substantial, then they should skew the cost behavior of government contractors 
relative to private sector firms doing comparable work.  
I investigate the effect of these costs on the Income Statement.  Income 
Statements have two major cost categories.  The Cost of Goods Sold captures the 
product cost for units sold and is obtained from matching the cost of products to the 
units sold.  These costs are fairly direct and have comparatively little wiggle room for 
adjustments.  The Selling, General, and Administrative (SGA) costs reflect the 
marketing, administrative, and general overhead costs of the organization.  These 
costs contain many allocations and are the likely place where any additional 
government contracting costs are going to show up.1   
My research builds upon prior work that investigates the behavior of SGA 
costs.  A classic paper, Andersen, Banker, & Janakiraman (2003) investigated the 
behavior of SGA costs when revenue increased versus revenue decreased.  They 
found that SGA costs are sticky in that SGA costs increase more when revenues 
rise than SGA costs decrease when revenues fall. Potential explanations for the 
stickiness include the existence of SGA fixed costs (Balakrishnan, Labro, & 
Soderstrom, 2010), or that managers are reluctant to reduce SGA capacity when 
they believe that a short run cut in revenues is likely to be reversed in the near future 
(Andersen, et al., 2007; Balakrishnan & Gruca, 2008).   
1 While the government has explicit rules about how these costs are presented in their forms, the 
published financial statements follow financial accounting rules known as the Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles. 
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I extend the SGA sticky cost framework to investigate whether firms with 
significant federal contracting have different SGA responses to revenue increases 
and/or decreases.  If a firm believes that the expertise in federal procurement 
practice is a core competency, then it will be reluctant to reduce its procurement staff 
in response to lower revenues. I conjecture that federal focus firms will have much 
stickier costs than will firms in the private sector. 
An important innovation in my paper is the creation of a federal focus sample.  
Prior work has investigated the behavior of federal contractors by assuming that the 
firms with the largest dollar sales to the federal government are most affected by 
federal contracts (Wang & San Miguel, 2012).  However, an important problem with 
this approach is that a very large firm like Proctor and Gamble may be one of the 
most important sellers to the federal government, but the federal sales may be a 
small percentage of Proctor and Gamble’s total sales.  In addition, Proctor and 
Gamble may supply generic products such as toothpaste which do not require 
satisfying unique federal requirements (and related paperwork). For these reasons, it 
may not be correct to say that Proctor and Gamble is a federal focus firm. 
My federal focus sample is created in a different fashion.  I use Compustat’s 
Segment database to identify firms that have a business segment which contain the 
words federal, government, or military.  These federal focus companies believe that 
federal business is so important that they have built their organization structure on 
this business. Their organization structure signals they have a federal focus.  While 
there is some overlap between my list of federal focus companies and the list of 
firms with the greatest sales to the federal government, roughly two-thirds of my 
federal focus firms are not on the list of the largest 500 federal dollar contractors. 
Once I generate the federal focus sample, I estimate an SGA sticky cost 
regression where I include interaction terms for federal focus firms.  The results 
show that the control firms have mild SGA cost stickiness.  Raising revenue by 1% 
leads to a 0.69% rise in SGA costs, while lowering revenues by 1% leads to a 0.63% 
decline in SGA costs.  The main analysis compares the federal focus firms to the 
controls. There are significant differences for federal focus firms.  Raising revenues 
by 1% leads to a 0.83% rise in SGA costs, a 20% increase over the control firms.  
Federal focus firms have higher ramp up in SGA costs, possibly due to increased 
paperwork for fulfilling government orders.  In the same vein, lowering revenues by 
1% leads to a 0.45% drop in SGA costs, a 29% smaller drop than the controls.  SGA 
costs for federal focus companies are much sticker than for the control firms.  This 
increased stickiness could be due to a reluctance to fire highly trained procurement 
staff or, alternatively, much higher fixed SGA costs. 
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As a check on the reasonableness of my model, I estimated a COGS sticky 
cost model.  My results show that federal focus firms display a symmetric response 
to revenue increases or decreases.  A 1% increase (decrease) in revenues leads to 
a statistically identical 1% increase (decrease) in COGS.  This symmetry is 
consistent with the use of fixed price contracts which specify both the revenues and 
cogs in advance.  My control firms display a slightly different result.  The control 
firms are similar to federal focus firms when revenues fall. A 1% revenue decline 
leads to a statistically identical 1% drop in COGS.  However, a 1% increase in 
control firm revenues leads to a 1.04% increase in COGS.  My control firms exhibit 
decreasing returns to scale.  In addition, the difference between COGS behavior 
when revenues increase and decrease suggests a mild form of COGS stickiness for 
my control firms.   
Robustness tests suggest that my results are knife edge.  Changing the time 
period or the control group leads to insignificant results. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: The second section 
discusses prior research, followed by a presentation of the sticky cost models.  The 
sample is then created and descriptive statistics are calculated.   Estimation results 
follow, and the final section contains the conclusion.   
Literature Review 
There has been a fair amount of prior work that has used published financial 
statements to examine various features of acquisition and contracting. Arnold, 
McNicol, and Fasana (2009) investigated the impact of various contract forms on 
contract performance. Berteau, Levy, Ben-Ari, and Moore (2011) used financial 
statements to analyze the ability of government contractors to obtain capital 
throughout defense booms and busts.  Wang and San Miguel (2012) investigated 
whether government contractors are obtaining excessive profits.  My work 
complements those prior works by providing an analysis of costs, an important 
component in determining both performance and profits. 
My work investigates the total cost numbers for the organization. The reason 
is straightforward.  Prior work has shown that firms have the incentives and 
capability to shift costs from the private sector to the government sector (McGowan 
and Vendrzyk, 2002; Rogerson, 1992). Cost shifting between the firm’s private and 
public units generates canceling positive and negative entries when the total firm 
costs are calculated. 
Balakrishnan and Gruca (2008) examined sticky costs at the department level 
in hospitals.  They found that in downturns, hospital administrators are reluctant to 
trim costs and capacity in core activities directly related to patient care.  
Administrators first adjust costs and capacity in peripheral areas.  This research 
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suggests that in a downturn, firms with a federal focus may wish to maintain critical 
government contract-related processes.  
The Sticky Cost Models 
Andersen, Banker, and Janakiraman (ABJ; 2003) performed the seminal 
analysis of SGA cost stickiness. Their model discriminated between periods when 
revenues increase and those when revenues decrease.  Costs are sticky when the 
costs have a greater rise when revenues increase than costs fall when revenues 
decrease. 
Equation 1 provides their basic sticky cost model specification,2 log � 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖.𝑡𝑡
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1� =  𝛼𝛼0 +  𝛼𝛼1  log � 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1� +  𝛼𝛼2 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗ log � 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ,     (1) 
where DecrDum  is one for firm i when sales revenues fall from period t-1 to t and is 
zero otherwise. If SGA costs are sticky, then the coefficient a2 should be negative 
and significant. 
I extend equation (1) to investigate whether federal focus firms have different 
SGA stickiness than control firms. I create a set of interaction variables which 
separate out the incremental effect of federal focus firms. Specifically, I use a 
dummy variable FSeg which is one if the firm has a separate 
government/federal/military segment and is zero otherwise.  My SGA Sticky Cost 
model is presented in equation 2: 3  
log � 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1� =  𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1  log� 𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1� +  𝛼𝛼2 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗ log � 𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1� 
                         +  𝛼𝛼3 𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹 +  𝛼𝛼4 𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹 ∗ log � 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1� 
                           + 𝛼𝛼5 𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹 ∗ 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗ log � 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1� +  𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡.                                (2) 
  
2 The ABJ model allows for a cross-section analysis across a wide range of industries, with large 
differences in the size of firm.  Prior work (Davidson & MacKinnon, 1981) rejected a linear form in 
favor of the log-log specification.  
3 The variable Decrdum is defined in the text.  The data for the other variables is drawn from 
Compustat, Fundamental Annual.  Revenue is the Compustat variable sale, while SGA is the 
Compustat variable xsga. 
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While I believe that federal focus firms will have different SGA responses than 
the control firms, the direction of these changes is not obvious.  If federal focus firms 
respond differently to revenue increases, then coefficient a4 should be significant. If 
it is significantly positive (negative), then SGA costs have greater increases 
(decreases) than the controls. If federal focus firms respond differently to revenue 
decreases, then the expression (a4 + a5) should be significant.  If the sum is 
significantly positive (negative), then federal focus firms have less (more) sticky SGA 
costs than the controls.  
We can obtain additional insight into the differences between federal focus 
firms and the controls by repeating the sticky cost analysis for Cost of Goods Sold 
(COGS), the other major expense on most firm’s Income Statements.  SGA costs 
contain many indirect costs of the organization.  In contrast, the major component of 
COGS is the value of products/services sold that period, which tends to have a more 
straightforward relationship with revenues. I anticipate that either COGS has a 
symmetric response to revenue increases and decreases - COGS is not sticky - or 
that COGS is less sticky than SGA.   
My COGS sticky cost model is a variant on Equation 2 and shown as 
Equation 3:4 
log� 𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1� =  𝛽𝛽0 +  𝛽𝛽1  log� 𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝛽𝛽2 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗ log� 𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1� 
                         +  𝛽𝛽3 𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹 +  𝛽𝛽4𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹 ∗ log � 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1� 
                           + 𝛽𝛽5 𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹 ∗  𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗ log � 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1� +  𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡                                (3) 
As with SGA costs, I believe that there will be a difference in how federal 
focus firms’ COGS responds to revenue changes, but have no prediction as to the 
direction of the changes. If federal focus firms’ COGS responds differently to 
revenue increases, then coefficient 𝛽𝛽4 should be significant. If federal focus firms’ 
COGS responds differently to revenue decreases, then the expression (𝛽𝛽4 + 𝛽𝛽5) 
should be significant.  
Now that I have presented the models, I turn to the data.  
4 The variable Decrdum is defined in the text.  The data for the other variables is drawn from 
Compustat, Fundamental Annual.  Revenue is the Compustat variable sale, while COGS is the 
Compustat variable cogs.  
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Sample Creation and Descriptive Statistics 
My sample was created in two steps.  I first obtained a set of federal focus 
firms, then generated control firms for these companies. 
Federal Focus Firms 
The critical element in my research is identifying companies with a federal 
focus.  Prior research (Wang & San Miguel, 2012) has examined the behavior of 
companies with the greatest dollar value contracts with the federal Government.  
One problem with this approach is that a large dollar value may not reflect a federal 
focus.  For instance, Proctor and Gamble has significant sales to the government, 
but its sales tend to be for off-the-shelf items such as toothpaste.  Proctor and 
Gamble may not need to deal with issues involving government-specific 
specifications and may have minimal incremental paperwork requirements. Because 
of these issues, I use a different approach to identify federal focus firms.  
Financial accounting standards require publicly traded firms to separately 
report information about major business segments.  Segment reporting is intended 
to give information to investors and creditors regarding the financial results and 
position of the most important operating units of a company.5 Firms that report a 
federal segment have identified themselves as having a significant line of business 
related to the federal government.   
Table 1, Panel A describes how I generated my list of federal focus firms.  I 
began with all observations on the Compustat Segment database which lists all 
reported segments for all publicly traded companies in the US.  The Compustat 
Annual Updates—Segment database is comparatively new and only has data for the 
last four years, 2010–2013.  I searched the database for segment names that 
contained the term “Defense,” “Military,” “Federal,” “Government,” or “Govt.”  This 
search process identified 39 unique parent companies.  Each of these companies 
believes that their Federal/Government/Military segment is sufficiently different and 
important to warrant separate presentation in their financial statements. 
5 Accounting Tools, http://www.accountingtools.com/questions-and-answers/what-is-segment-
reporting.html, provides an excellent description of segment reporting on its website: 
 Under Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), an operating segment engages in  
 business activities from which it may earn revenues and incur expenses, has discrete  
 financial information available, and whose results are regularly reviewed by the entity's chief  
 operating decision maker for performance assessment and resource allocation decisions.  
 Follow these rules to determine which segments need to be reported: 
• Aggregate the results of two or more segments if they have similar products, services, 
processes, customers, distribution methods, and regulatory environments. 
• Report a segment if it has at least 10% of the revenues, 10% of the profit or loss, or 10% 
of the combined assets of the entity. 
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Table 1. The Sample Creation   
 













































Active and Inactive Observations From 
         Compustat Annual Updates – Segments  




Parent Firms with Federal, Government,  
          or Military Segment 
 
        39 
Observations for Federal focus from Compustat, 
         Fundamental Annual, 1993 - 2012 
  
      517 
  
Less: 
       
         Outliers       473 




      269  
Number of Unique Companies         35 
  
 
Active and Inactive Observations From 
Compustat,   




Less observations excluded because they are:  
              Foreign Companies 191,744 
              Missing or Infeasible data   89,214 
              Sales decrease and SGA/COGS  
                increase or SGA > Sales 
   
 80,096 
              Not in Fed Focus Industry or Year   49,741 
              Outliers   43,103 
              Influential Observations   39,539 
 
Total Observations   39,539 
Number of Unique Companies      6,991 
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I used the parent company identification to draw data from Compustat, 
Fundamental Annual for the years 1993–2012.6  At this stage there were 517 
observations. Later analysis trimmed outliers and removed influential observations.  
The final list of federal focus firms contains 269 observations for 35 unique 
companies.   
My list of 35 federal focus firms and their associated industry, their Naics 
Sector, is provided in Table 2.  While the majority of the firms are in manufacturing 
industries, there is a wide divergence of other industries represented, from 
construction to educational services. 
Table 2. Federal Focus Companies by Naics Sector 
 





*  A top 500 recipient of defense contracts for 2008. 
 
 
CONSTRUCTION- 23 WHOLESALE TRADE - 42 
FLUOR CORP* AAR CORP* 
KBR INC NASH FINCH CO 
MANUFACTURING - 32, 33 INFORMATION - 51 
USEC INC SAPIENT CORP 
ALLIANT TECHSYSTEMS INC* FINANCE AND INSURANCE - 52 
ANAREN INC HEALTH NET INC* 
BOEING CO* PROFESSIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL - 54 
CUBIC CORP BAKER (MICHAEL) CORP* 
EMS TECHNOLOGIES INC CH2M HILL COS LTD 
FEDERAL SIGNAL CORP INTEGRAL SYSTEMS INC* 
FLIR SYSTEMS INC SAIC INC 
GENCORP INC URS CORP* 
HARRIS CORP* ADMINISTRATIVE AND SUPPORT - 56 
II-VI INC ENERGYSOLUTIONS INC 
IROBOT CORP KFORCE INC 
ITT CORP* EDUCATIONAL SERVICES - 61 
MOOG INC  -CL A GP STRATEGIES CORP 
NATIONAL PRESTO INDS INC  
RAYTHEON CO*  
SPARTON CORP  
SYMMETRICOM INC  
TEL-INSTRUMENT ELECTRONICS  
TELEDYNE TECHNOLOGIES INC*  
TRIMAS CORP  
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As was mentioned previously, my approach to identifying firms with federal 
focus differs from prior work. For instance, Wang and San Miguel (2012) used 
Fedspending.org to identify 112 publicly traded companies in the 500 companies 
with the largest dollar values of defense contracts awarded in 2008.  Comparing 
their list to Table 2 shows that there are 12 firms in common.  Untabulated results 
show that the 12 common firms are substantially larger than the other 23 firms.7 
Control Sample 
My control sample provides a benchmark to judge the performance of the 
federal focus firms.  Table 1, Panel B provides the details. 
The control sample began with the entire set of active and inactive Compustat 
firms for 1993–2012.  I deleted foreign firms.  I then removed observations missing 
data or with infeasible data (e.g., negative revenues).  Next, I dropped observations 
if Sales decreased, but SGA or COGS rose.  Following ABJ, I also removed 
observations if the firm’s their SGA costs were greater than Revenues. I then 
deleted all year * industry observations with no federal focus observation in that year 
* industry. 
Prior work has consistently found that sticky costs only show up in the 
estimation results after extensive data cleaning. For instance, ABJ trimmed 1% of all 
variables and threw out all influential regression observations in order to generate 
results.  My sample contains a later time period than ABJ and includes the Great 
Recession. It therefore contains many more outliers than ABJ. In order to obtain 
baseline results with SGA (COGS) sticky costs, I removed the top and bottom 5% of 
the log � 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1� observations and the top (bottom) 0.5% of the 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗log � 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1� observations. Although I trimmed many observations, the range of 
variation in my data in the retained data is comparable to prior work.   
My final data reduction removed all observations that were influential in either 
the SGA or COGS Sticky Cost regressions.8  My final set of controls consists of 
39,539 observations over 20 years for 6,991 firms in nine industries. 
My estimation sample combines the control firms with the federal focus firms. 
One important observation is that there are comparatively few federal focus (269) to 
control observations (39,539).  A major concern is that the signal from the small 
number of federal focus observations could be drowned out by the large number of 
7 The 12 firms on both lists have average assets (sales) of 7,786 (8,927), while the 23 other firms in 
my sample have average assets (sales) of 995 (1,434).  
8 Deleting observations for each regression separately generates qualitatively identical results.  
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controls.  Although this is a valid issue, the regression results generate statistically 
significant, and intuitive, estimates.   
The imbalance between the number of control and federal focus observations 
may explain the knife-edge nature of my results.  The federal focus signal is strong 
only under a tightly controlled set of data conditions.   
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3, Panel A provides the descriptive statistics for my sample.  
Supplemental information shows that average total assets are comparable for 
federal focus and control firms (3,972 million versus 3,892 million), but that on 
average federal focus firms have more employees (16,803 versus 5,556).  In 
addition, federal focus firms have higher revenues, higher SGA expense, and 
greater COGS.  These disparities are excellent reasons why equations 2 and 3 use 
ratios to control for scale effects.  
Table 3, Panel B runs Wilcoxon non-parametric test for differences between 
variables in the control and federal focus sub-samples. The tests fail to reject that 
the dependent variables, { log � 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1� , log � 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1� }, and one of the independent 
variables, log � 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1�, are drawn from the same distribution.  However, the 
interaction term, 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗ log � 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1�, does show a significant difference 
between federal focus and control observations. This difference has two sources.  
First, federal focus firms have fewer revenue decreases than controls (11.9% versus 
19.5%).  Second, untabulated results show that, conditional on revenues falling, the 
federal focus firms have a smaller reduction in the log revenue ratio  (-0.0787 versus 
-0.190).  When revenues fall, federal focus firms are not hit as hard as the control 
firms.  
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics and Pairwise Tests 
Now that I have described the data, I turn to the regression analysis.  
Panel A. Variables 
 
 Combined 
N = 39,808 
Federal Focus 
N = 269 
Controls 
N = 39,539 






Supplemental Information       
Total Assets1 3,892.2 35,221 3,971.5 9,867.4 3,891.7 35  
Number Employees2 5.6322 21.460 16.803 30.914 5.5563 21  
Components       
SGA1  332.09 1,484,2  508.75 1,029.5  330.89 1,  
COGS1 1,142.9 6,858.1 3,799.6 8,217.0 1,124.8 6,  
Revenue1 1,794.1 9,296.1 4,749.2 10,175 1,773.9 9,  
Decrdum 0.1948 0.3961 0.1190 0.3243 0.1953 0.  
Dependent Variables       
Log(SGAi,t/SGAi,t-1) 0.0753 0.1814 0.0685 0.0860 0.0754 0.  
Log(COGSi,t/COGSi,t-1) 0.0970 0.2332 0.0920 0.0979 0.0970 0.  
Independent Variables        
Log(Revenuei,t/Revenuei,t-1) 0.1014 0.2064 0.0897 0.0950 0.1015 0.  
Decrdum * 
Log(Revenuei,t/Revenuei,t-1) 
-0.0369 0.1036 -0.0009 0.0349 -0.0371 0.  
FSeg 0.0067 0.0819 1 - 0 - 
 
 









Pr. > F 
Dependent Variables     
Log(SGAi,t/SGAi,t-1) 0.0685 0.0754 0.3793 0.5380 
Log(COGSi,t/COGSi,t-1) 0.0920 0.0970 0.1242 0.7245 
Independent Variables      
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Estimation Results 
Selling, General, and Administrative Costs Results 
Table 4, Column 1, contains the estimation results for the Selling, General 
and Administrative (SGA) Sticky Cost model.9  The model uses a a log-log 
specification, which means that all coefficients (except the constants) generate an 
elasticity. 
Table 4. Sticky Cost Regressions,1 Dependent Variables log[SGAt/SGA(t-1)], 
log[COGSt/COGS(t-1)] 
 
1Industry fixed effects are not reported.  Standard errors are calculated using the Stata robust option. 
My control sample’s behavior is captured by coefficients a1 and a2.  The 
control results demonstrate sticky SGA costs, though the costs are less sticky than 
in older samples.10 Combining the correct coefficients shows that a 1% increase in 
the revenue ratio (a1) leads to a 0.692% increase in the control firms’ SGA, while a 
9 The models are estimated with fixed industry effects and use robust standard errors.  The VIF 
scores show no significant multicollinearity in either equation. 
10 Anderson, Banker, and Janakiraman 2003 estimate cost stickiness for 20 years; from 1979 to 1998 
for all but the financial services industry.  They find [Table 2, Model (I)] a comparable increase in SGA 
costs when revenues rise (0.5459 versus my 0.6922), but a larger decline when costs fall (-0.1914 to 
my -0.0628).  I conjecture the differences are due to my restriction to a subset of industries as well as 
the different time periods.  
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1% decrease (a1+a2) leads to a 0.629% decrease in SGA.  The SGA costs are 
0.063% sticky (a2).  I can benchmark the magnitude of these effects by evaluating 
the elasticity at the mean sample values. When revenues (average 1,794 million) 
increase/decrease by 1%, they change by 17.94 million.  When revenues rise (fall) 
by 17.94 million; SGA costs (average 332.1 million) increase (fall) by 2.30 (2.09) 
million.  At the median combined sample values, SGA costs stick by 0.21 million, or 
roughly $210,000.  
The impact of a federal focus on the SGA costs is identified through the 
interaction terms. Combining the correct coefficients for federal-focused companies 
(a1+a3), when the revenue ratio rises by 1%, the SGA ratio rises by 0.828%, which is 
0.136% more than for the controls (a4). When revenues rise, federal focus 
companies have a .136/.692 = 19.7% increase in SGA over the controls.  This 
incremental rise could reflect greater paperwork requirements/fulfillment costs for 
federal focus firms. Combining the correct coefficients (a1+a2+a3+a4), when 
revenues fall by 1%, the SGA ratio for federal focus falls by 0.447%, which is 
0.182% less than for the controls (a1+a2).  When revenues fall, federal focus 
companies have a .182/.629 = 28.9% smaller decrease in SGA costs than control 
companies.  The slower fall could reflect greater fixed costs for federal focus 
companies; in particular, greater fixed staff costs in the procurement process. 
The dollar impact for federal focus companies can be evaluated using the 
mean sample values.  When revenues rise by 1% (17.94 million), SGA costs rise by 
2.75 million for federal focus companies versus 2.30 million for the controls - a 0.45 
million cost difference.  When revenues fall by 1% (17.94 million), SGA costs fall by 
1.48 million for federal focus companies, and by 2.09 million for the controls - a 0.61 
million cost difference.  The dollar value of the federal focus difference is 
understated since federal focus firms tend to be much larger than the control firms.11 
  
11 If the numbers are evaluated at the median federal focus firm value [SGA 508.75], then a 1% 
revenue increase would cause SGA for controls to rise by 3.522 and federal focus by 4.213, a 
difference of 0.691 million.  A 1% revenue decrease would cause SGA for controls to fall by 3.202 
million, and federal focus by 2.273 million, a difference of 0.929 million.  
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Figure 1 illustrates the qualitative behavior of SGA costs for both the controls 
and the federal focus companies.  If a firm is federal focused, then SGA costs rise 
faster when revenue increases, but fall slower when revenue decreases.   
 
Figure 1. The Change in the SGA Ratio as a Result of Revenue Increases 
and Decreases 
Cost of Goods Sold 
Table 4, Column 2 presents the estimation results for the COGS cost 
stickiness model.  
The control group exhibits some COGS cost stickiness (COGS equation a2, 
0.054%) though it is less than for the control SGA stickiness (SGA equation a2, 
0.063%). Combining the correct COGS equation coefficients shows that 1% 
increase in revenues (a1) leads to a 1.043% increase in COGS, while a 1% 
decrease (a1+a2) leads to a 0.988% decrease in COGS.12  The COGS costs are 
0.056% sticky (a2).  
Although the COGS has a higher percentage increase (1.043%) than the 
percentage revenue increase (0.988%), this does not mean that profits are negative.  
Evaluating the elasticities at the mean sample values shows the following.  When 
revenues (average 1,794 million) rise by 1% (17.94 million), then COGS (mean 
1,143) increases by 11.92 million. When revenues fall by 17.94 million, then COGS 
declines by 11.30 million.  
12 The incremental change in SGA for non-federal contractors for an increase in revenues is a1, and a 
decrease in revenues is (a1+a2).  
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When revenues fall, the control firm’s 0.988% decrease in COGS is 
suspiciously close to 1%. An untabulated test supports the idea that the COGS 
decrease is 1% [p = 0.8650].13 The interpretation is that when revenues fall by 1%, 
the control firms have a lockstep 1% drop in COGS.  This lockstep change is 
consistent with a stronger linkage between revenues and COGS than between 
revenues and SGA. 
As with the SGA analysis, the impact of federal focus is captured by the 
interaction terms.  Combining the correct coefficients (a1+a3) for federal focus firms, 
when the revenue ratio rises by 1%, the COGS ratio rises by 1.003%, which is 
0.0395% less than for non-contractors.  An untabulated test shows that the federal 
focus COGS rise is statistically insignificantly different from 1% [p = 0.2679]. When 
revenues rise by 1%, federal-focused firms have COGS rise in lockstep by 1%. 
Combining the correct coefficients (a1+a2+a3+a4), provides the decline for federal 
focus companies when revenues fall, 1.0173%.  A further statistical test shows that 
the drop in the COGS ratio is also statistically identical to 1% [p = 0.4464]. 
Combining the previous results, federal focus firms have a linear relationship 
between revenues and COGS.  When revenues increase or decrease by 1%, COGS 
does the same.  This strong connection could be due to the use of fixed price 
government contracts, where both the revenues and profit margins are determined 
in advance.  
Figure 2 illustrates the qualitative behavior of COGS  for both the control 
group and the firms with federal focus.  A federal focus firm has COGS rise 
symmetrically with revenue increases and decreases.  A 1% rise (fall) in revenues 
leads to a 1% rise (fall) in COGS. Control firms have a similar 1% drop in COGS for 
a drop in revenue, but have a faster rise in COGS for an increase in revenues.   
13 The test fails to reject the hypothesis that the a1 + a3 = 1. 
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Figure 2. The Change in the COGS Ratio as a Result of Revenue Increases 
and Decreases 
Robustness checks  
My robustness tests suggest that my results are delicate, are knife-edge.  
Reducing the time period from 20 to 15 (10) years generates qualitatively similar 
control coefficients, but the federal focus coefficients become insignificant. 
Alternatively, using the median industry values as controls leads to all coefficients 
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Conclusions 
Federal government contractors are qualitatively different than other firms 
(Kovacic, 1992).  Contractors complain about excessive paperwork requirements, 
fixed margins, and long lead times to obtain contracts.  I examine whether these 
problems are large enough to show up in the published financial accounting data.  I 
use the behavior of costs on firms’ published Income Statements to address this 
issue. 
There are two major expense categories on the income statement: Selling, 
General, and Administrative (SGA) expense, and Cost of Goods Sold (COGS) 
expense. My analysis compares and contrasts the behavior of these two expense 
categories for a sample of federal focus and control firms. 
An important innovation in my paper is the creation of a federal focus sample.   
I use Compustat’s Segment database to identify firms that have a business 
segment labeled federal, government, or military.  These federal focus companies 
believe that their federal government business is so important that they have built 
their organization structure around it. While there is some overlap between my list of 
federal focus companies and the firms with the greatest sales to the federal 
government, roughly two-thirds of my federal focus firms are not on the list of the 
largest 500 federal dollar contractors.  My sample contains a different, and possibly 
superior, set of companies than offered by prior work. 
Once I generated the federal focus sample, I estimated a SGA sticky cost 
regression where I included interaction terms for federal focus firms.  The results 
show that the controls have mild SGA cost stickiness.  Raising revenue 1% leads to 
a 0.70% rise in SGA costs, while lowering revenues 1% leads to a 0.63% decline in 
SGA costs.  My main results show that there are significant differences for federal-
focused firms.  Raising revenues 1% leads to a 0.82% rise in SGA costs, a 20% 
increase over the controls.  When revenues rise, federal-focused firms have higher 
ramp up in SGA costs, possibly due to increased paperwork for fulfilling government 
orders.  In the same vein, lower revenues 1% leads to a 0.45% drop in SGA costs, 
about 29% below the reduction for the control group.  SGA costs for federal focus 
companies are much stickier than for the controls.  The reluctance to reduce SGA 
costs is consistent with federal focus firms maintaining their core federal 
procurement process in a downturn. 
As a reasonableness check, I estimate a COGS sticky cost regression.  
Federal focus firms display a symmetric response to revenue increases or 
decreases.  A 1% increase (decrease) in revenues leads to a statistically identical 
1% increase (decrease) in COGS.  This symmetry is consistent with the more direct 
nature of COGS as well as fixed price government contracts.  My control firms 
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display a slightly different result.  The controls are similar to federal focus firms when 
revenues fall. A 1% revenue ratio decline leads to a statistically identical 1% drop in 
COGS.  However, a 1% increase in revenues leads to a 1.04% increase in COGS.  
The control firms exhibit both decreasing returns to scale as well as a mild amount of 
COGS stickiness.   
Robustness tests suggest that my sample is delicate.  Changing the time 
frame or the approach to generating controls leads to no significant results.  This 
delicacy may be due to the small number of federal focus observations relative to 
control observations. 
My paper provides evidence that SGA costs behave differently for 
government contractors.  Balakrishnan, Petersen, and Soderstrom (2004) provided 
evidence that the magnitude of the change matters.  They showed that very large 
changes in costs lead to greater responsiveness (less stickiness) than smaller 
changes, and argued that transaction costs will dampen or remove small changes, 
but not affect larger changes.  While similar behavior might hold for federal 
contractors, I cannot investigate this issue. My sample contains too few observations 
to analyze this issue. 
My analysis looks at the behavior of firms which have a federal focus.  
However, it does not investigate one other important aspect of government 
contracting: the form of the contracts.  A large body of theoretical literature explores 
the relationship between optimal contracts and information in procurement (Laffont & 
Tirole, 1986; Rogerson, 1994).  For instance, cost plus contracts may lead to 
improved risk sharing, but can lead firms to shift costs from commercial to 
government contracts (Rogerson, 1992; Chen & Gunny, 2014).  In contrast, fixed 
price contracts provide no incentives to shift costs, but may lead firms to underinvest 
in fixed assets to support the contract.  My SGA sticky cost results are consistent 
with the cost shifting of cost plus contract, but I have no information as to the actual 
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